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Two psychologies of the crisis
Psychology and the pandemic
At the start of the pandemic, one of us (SR) co-authored 
a book on the psychology of COVID-19. It started with the 
following claim:
…unless or until a vaccine is developed, or we discover 
medicines to treat the virus, our means of controlling the 
spread of infection depend on behavioural changes and 
hence upon human psychology”.1
But now that we have vaccines it is self-evident that the 
behavioural questions remain just as important as ever. 
Vaccines alone solve nothing. It is people getting vaccinated, 
and the protection that vaccination confers against disease, 
that will make a difference. So we have to deal with issues 
of vaccine hesitancy.2 We also need to address issues of 
vaccine complacency,3 and how being vaccinated may affect 
other behaviours necessary to stop the spread of infection.
Behavioural science has been at the very heart of debates 
around the pandemic. Issues to do with social infl uence, 
behavioural change, the grounds of trust, the basis of 
community – once the preserve of the tutorial room – 
have become the topic of talk shows and news bulletins. 
Relationships have been forged between behavioural 
scientists, researchers from other disciplines, policymakers 
and practitioners that rarely existed before. More than ever, 
behavioural science is seen to matter.
However, the impact of the pandemic lies not only in inviting 
behavioural scientists to the policymakers table, but also 
in posing the question of what sort of behavioural science 
should be used to support the public. More specifi cally, we 
wish to contrast two broad psychological approaches to 
human behaviour that have very different implications for 
how to respond in a crisis.4 
Fragile rationalism
One view suggests that people are fragile rationalists 
who, at the best of times, are beset by biases which lead 
them to distort information, and fi nd it diffi cult to cope 
with complexity and ambiguity and uncertainty. The human 
condition is defi cient in reason and therefore one cannot 
deal with people through reason.5 When put under pressure 
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in a crisis, things get still worse. We are prone to panic, to 
become even more irrational and therefore transform a crisis 
into a tragedy.6
This approach is particularly associated with behavioural 
economics and popularised through the concept of ‘nudge’.7 
It was systematically introduced into the UK Government 
through the Behavioural Insights Team (or ‘nudge unit’)8 
established within the Cabinet Offi ce by David Cameron in 
2010, since when it has grown considerably in infl uence. 
Such an approach has many attractions to policymakers, 
not least because it is a justifi cation for the existence of the 
state: if people are incapable of looking after themselves 
(especially in a crisis) they need someone or something to 
look after them. At the same time, it leads to a form of 
paternalism whereby the public are seen as less able, unfi t 
for a conversation of equals and needing to be shielded from 
hard realities or looming uncertainties. This paternalism is 
fostered by the belief that people (‘the public’) will panic in 
the face of such uncertainties. 
This approach has arguably had a major infl uence in framing 
the policy response to COVID-19 at the UK level. This was 
most clearly expressed in the notion of ‘behavioural fatigue’ 
which was articulated even before the Coronavirus Act9 
‘stay at home’ measures (lockdown) were implemented in 
England and the devolved nations in March 2020. This term 
encapsulated the idea that people would be psychologically 
incapable of dealing with the rigours of strict COVID 
containment measures for any length of time (and hence it 
would be counterproductive to bring in such measures before 
they were absolutely necessary). This arguably contributed to 
a delay in the introduction of lockdown measures in March 
202010 and may have greatly increased preventable mortality 
from COVID-19.11
Since March 2020, the term ‘behavioural fatigue’ along 
with associated terms (‘pandemic fatigue’, ‘emergency 
fatigue’, ‘lockdown fatigue’, ‘public fatigue’) has become 
endemic in the UK. By October 2020 ‘pandemic fatigue’ 
had some 200 million hits on Google scholar,12 and by 
January 2020 that had risen to 240 million.13 Almost daily, 
behavioural scientists are contacted by the media to answer 
a single question: ‘will the public continue to comply with 
regulations?’ The constant fear articulated by government 
ministers at UK level is that the public will prove to be the 
weak link in the pandemic response. The narrative is that 
their inability to desist from social contact will undermine all 
the measures taken to control infection transmission and, 
as a result, be to blame for the failure of policies to address 
the pandemic.
This fear has also been magnifi ed by media coverage that 
has focused on signs of non-adherence and amplified 
concerns about pandemic fatigue. Examples of rule breaking 
have been seized upon14 and, arguably, this has contributed 
to perceptions of fragility and lack of resilience among the 
public and therefore to fears that protective behaviours can 
not be maintained. 
Collective resilience
In contrast to ‘the fragile rationalist’, a second approach 
takes a more constructive and collective view of the human 
psyche and the human subject. According to this view, 
people do not so much distort and destroy information 
as create meaning. Critically, we do that together. It is 
through consensus that a mere individual opinion becomes 
established as a social fact15 – something solid enough to 
form the basis for action. Moreover, others do not just provide 
the epistemic basis for action but also the practical means. 
It is through the assumed and actual support of others that 
we become empowered to enact our understandings.16 This 
is not to deny that people can be in error, or that groups 
can act in pathological ways – they plainly can. However, 
those pathologies are not so much psycho-pathologies (in 
the sense of inherent limitations and fl aws in the human 
cognitive system) as socio-pathologies (in the sense of 
limitations in social systems of belief). 
The contrast between the two approaches is particularly stark 
in a crisis. Whereas ‘the fragile rationalist’ is seen to become 
entirely irrational due to the stress of the situation, this 
latter approach suggests that people become more resilient 
because the common fate of being in an earthquake or a 
fl ood – or a pandemic – leads to the accentuation of a sense 
of shared identity. We begin to think more collectively (in 
terms of ‘we’ not ‘I’), to become more concerned for others, 
and to seek more support from people, and provide more 
support to them. That is, we develop collective resilience.17
The two approaches not only differ in their accounts of 
how people behave in a crisis, they also have very different 
implications for how people should be treated. From a ‘fragile 
rationalist’ viewpoint, the public are a problem which has 
to be managed. They cannot be reasoned with. They need 
to be shielded from unsettling evidence since this will only 
make them more likely to panic. From a ‘collective resilience 
viewpoint’ the main task is to consolidate that fragile sense 
of shared identity which arises out of a crisis – shared 
identity amongst the public can also be between the public 
and authorities – for only if authority is seen as ‘of the 
people’ and acting ‘for the people’ will people take heed of 
them when seeking to make sense of what is going on and 
deciding how to act.18
What is more, the most effective way for policymakers to 
build such a sense of shared identity with the public – and 
hence to increase adherence to laws, rules and regulations – 
is to treat people as if they are members of a common group: 
to demonstrate transparency, trust and respect; to listen 
and to heed what people have to say.19 In other words, the 
paternalism that fl ows from a fragile rationalism perspective 
is not only misguided from a collective resilience perspective. 
It is the very worst thing one could do. By treating the public 
as a defi cient ‘other’ it undermines the ability to engage them 
in common cause to overcome the crisis.
So, what have we learnt from a year of COVID-19 about the 
merits and demerits of these two psychologies? Which better 
50TH ANNIVERSARY YEAR    JUNE 2021  VOLUME 51 SUPPLEMENT 1  JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS OF EDINBURGH    S13 
From the ‘fragile rationalist’ to ‘collective resilience’
explains the pattern of evidence and which provides a better 
guide as to how governments in the UK and elsewhere should 
treat the public?
The public response to COVID-19
The panic myth
Before considering the COVID pandemic itself, it is worth 
briefl y commenting on the wider literature on emergencies 
and disasters.
For all its currency in popular culture and government fears, 
panic is a comparatively rare phenomenon.20 Characteristically, 
people do not fl ee blindly from danger. Rather they respond 
in a controlled and organised way, helping each other out of 
harm’s way, supporting others – not just family and friends but 
strangers as well – who are vulnerable or hurt. Indeed, when 
people die in emergencies it is generally more because they 
stay behind to provide aid than because they trample others 
in their haste to fl ee.21
Such is the hold of the ‘panic myth’, however, that when we 
fi nd evidence of support and solidarity in a disaster, it is often 
put down to local or national exceptionalism. The heroism 
of offi ce workers, fi re fi ghters and others during 9/11, for 
instance is often attributed to a distinctive and ‘unbreakable 
spirit of New York’.22 Likewise, the way in which, following the 
2005 bombings, London simply carried on was attributed to 
a particularly British ‘Blitz spirit’.23 However, such behaviour 
is less a sign of unique character than the outcome of the 
general process of emergent social identity – a consequence 
of a human ‘community spirit’.
Three misconceptions about COVID adherence
Levels of adherence: As we have already noted above, in 
the COVID pandemic as for emergencies more generally, 
commentators have been constantly on the lookout for 
signs of fatigue and failure since before the fi rst lockdown. 
Ministers at UK level have continuously warned that public 
irresponsibility endangers the COVID response,24 media 
reports have fed us with a diet of ‘covidiots’,25 house parties 
and raves.26 Certainly, if you go by the public rhetoric it 
would appear that psychological fragility is very much the 
order of the day. Indeed, if you ask members of the public 
whether they think others are abiding by COVID regulations, 
the response is a resounding no. The great majority of the 
population believe that others are not complying (a belief 
undoubtedly increased by media coverage of examples of 
non-compliance) and 92% of us believe that we ourselves 
are complying more than the average.27
The reality is very different. From the start of the first 
lockdown, the evidence suggested very high levels of 
adherence – at least to measures on which people had the 
necessary resources (more on this presently). This wasn’t 
because people found it easy. Of the 92% who were adhering 
to ‘stay at home’ advice during to lockdown, nearly half (44%) 
were suffering economically or psychologically.28 Certainly, 
they were fatigued and badly wanted lockdown to end, but 
fatigue did not stop adherence.
Since then, levels of adherence have not only stayed high but, 
if anything, are higher than ever (again, where people have the 
necessary resources).29 Indeed, taking the latest fi gures from 
the Offi ce of National Statistics (ONS) (release of 26 February 
covering data collected in the period 10-21 February), 89% of 
people report handwashing when returning home, 96% wearing 
a mask in public, 92% avoiding physical contact outside the 
home, and 88% not having visitors to their home.30
This is no reason to be complacent. It is a matter of concern 
that 12% of people are meeting with others in their homes 
(and 18% are meeting up socially outside the home). 
However, the fi gures do point to the fact that, if there are 
substantial levels of contact between people (and hence 
potential for infection transmission) it is not primarily due 
to people ‘fl exing the rules’. It is more because the rules 
are fl exible enough to allow, encourage or even require, high 
levels of contact.
This has been true since the end of the fi rst lockdown at UK 
level, as the Prime Minister urged people to go to the pub as 
their ‘patriotic duty’31 and to return to their workplaces or else 
face the prospect of losing their jobs.32 It is encapsulated in 
another fi gure from the latest ONS release: in mid-February 
2021, in the midst of a so-called ‘lockdown’, 46% of the 
working population were travelling to their workplaces. 
Add to this the fact that some 20% of employees who are able 
to work from home were not allowed to,33 and that, despite 
some 97,000 complaints about unsafe workplaces, there 
have been no prosecutions for breaches of safety laws,34 then 
it becomes even clearer that public non-compliance may be 
a relatively minor contributor to infection spread despite all 
the attention given to it.
Reasons for non-adherence: According to the ‘frailty’ 
approach, it is not just that people fail to adhere, but that they 
do so because of their psychological weaknesses. Violation 
is wilful and comes from negative motives – or at least the 
atrophy of positive motives. Such a view was apparent in the 
language of the Prime Minister when, in his speech to the 
Commons on 22 September, he spoke of people ‘brazenly 
defying the rules’35 and, later the same day when speaking 
to the nation, of those who ‘fl out’ the rules.36
Here, it is necessary to make a simple but crucial distinction. 
Certainly, breaking the rules is a matter of behaviour. 
But not all behaviour is about psychology. As behaviour 
change theorists point out, it is also about capacities and 
opportunities.37 Most obviously, however much they might 
want to do so, people will not be able to undertake an action 
if they lack the means or resources necessary to do so. A 
study from the fi rst lockdown showed that people living in 
less affl uent communities and ethnic minorities were three 
to six times less likely to remain at home. Not because 
of differences in motivation – that did not differ between 
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groups – but because of the diffi culties of staying at home 
and putting food on the table.38
This returns to a point twice mentioned above. Adherence 
may be generally high to those rules whose observance is 
not dependent on resources. It is a very different matter 
when it comes to those which are. The key example here is 
self-isolation. Precise fi gures for those complying vary from 
study to study within the UK, from a low of 18%39 to a high of 
60% (although this latter study had a response rate of 16% 
and since adherence is probably correlated with responding, 
is probably an overestimate).40 The true fi gure is therefore 
probably between a half and a third. 
This refl ects the fact that self-isolation is hard to do and that 
very limited resources are available across the UK to help, in 
a nation where benefi ts are determined at UK level and do not 
differ even with diverse responses to the COVID-19 pandemic 
within the devolved nations. Finance is certainly part of it (in the 
UK, only about an eighth of adults are eligible to even apply for 
the £500 on offer, and of those who do apply, some 70% are 
refused).41 But even with fi nance, how does one self-isolate if 
one lives in a crowded house with one toilet and bathroom, if 
one has caring responsibilities to children or to elderly relatives 
in or out of the house? Where comprehensive support packages 
are available (like New York’s ‘take care’ scheme which offers 
money, hotel accommodation, food and medicines, mental 
health services…42 even help to walk the dog!43), adherence is 
much higher.44 In New York it stands at 80%.45
In sum, it seems that non-compliance in this pandemic may 
be more to do with opportunity than about motivation. This 
implies that securing higher compliance may be more to do 
with supporting than with sanctioning people. 
Reasons for adherence: If a ‘fragile rationalist’ perspective has 
misled us about both levels of non-adherence and reasons for 
non-adherence, the same is true of the reasons for adherence. 
Insofar as people are assumed to be unable (or at least to 
be inept) at reasoning for themselves, their behaviour is seen 
to be guided by authorities who seek (as far as possible) to 
make the right thing to do the easy thing to do. As we have 
already seen, this supposition is undermined by the fact that 
people have been adhering despite the fact that it is often 
very diffi cult. But equally, it is hard to sustain the claim that 
adherence is just a matter of doing what one is told.
Many people have noted how trust in the UK Government has 
fallen catastrophically since the ‘Cummings affair’ broke in 
May 2020 and remains historically low.46 However, as we have 
seen, levels of adherence did not show a corresponding fall. 
What is more, the decline in trust was specifi c to government 
at the UK level. There was not a corresponding fall in trust in 
the other devolved nation governments. Indeed, at the end of 
September 2020 trust in the Scottish Government stood at 
61% while the corresponding fi gure at the UK level was as low 
as 15%.47 However, levels of adherence are not signifi cantly 
different between Scotland and England. 
This does not suggest that trust is irrelevant to adherence. 
Indeed, it may be important. In a recent international study 
of behavioural intentions in 23 countries during April and May 
2020,48 participants were asked about their intentions to 
comply with public health measures (for example, willingness 
to self-isolate when needed) along with trust towards their 
government to handle the crisis, fellow citizens to comply, and 
trust in the work of scientists. The researchers found that the 
actual threat posed by the virus (infections and deaths from 
COVID-19) was not a strong predictor of individual intentions, 
but trust in governments, fellow citizens and science was. 
In Scotland, private government polling shows that some 
80% of people regularly agree to the proposition that, on the 
whole, the best thing to do is what the government suggests. 
But it does indicate that trust may not be the sole route to 
adherence and that many people may be adhering not because 
of and even despite the government. Post-Cummings, those 
who were most angry at his actions adhered more to show 
that they were not like him!49 To put it slightly differently, 
adherence is not a mindless act. People are not simply doing 
what they are told (which is why describing their behaviour 
as ‘compliance’ may be misleading). Rather, they are doing 
what they consider to be the right thing.
This begs the question of what constitutes ‘the right thing’. 
Here, it is useful to recall the words of Governor Andrew 
Cuomo of New York at his daily coronavirus briefi ng of 22 April 
2020. In response to a question regarding protests against 
COVID restrictions, he said: ‘You have a responsibility to me. 
It’s not just about you. You have responsibility to me, right? 
We started here saying, it’s not about me. It’s about we. Get 
your head around the we concept. It’s not all about you. It’s 
about me too. It’s about we’.50
To expand on Cuomo’s logic, if people think in terms of 
their individual identity (‘I’) and individual risks, they may 
well conclude (especially if they are young and healthy) that 
the costs of going out are negligible, the costs of staying 
home alone are great and therefore the overall cost-benefi t 
calculation favours breaking lockdown. But if they think in 
terms of their collective identity (‘we’), then the potential 
costs of going out could be the infection or even death of 
other members of the community and hence the calculation 
skews radically towards staying at home. To put it more 
technically, the calculus of risk, and hence the defi nition of 
what is the right thing to do is a function of whether people 
think in terms of their individual or social identities.
This pandemic, as with the previous emergencies described, 
led to the early emergence of a new sense of community 
and unity51 which has persisted throughout. Thus on 28 
February 2021 (the day this is being written) polling showed 
that more than three times as many people stated that 
the pandemic had made their community more united 
(41%) than stated it had made them less united (13%).52 
It further suggested that this unity was refl ected in action, 
with some 12.4 million adults volunteering to help out in 
the community.
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This sense of community has been shown to be associated 
with levels of adherence to COVID measures.53 An early-
pandemic UK survey found a sense of ‘we are in it together’ to 
be the best predictor of observance of lockdown measures.54 
A series of subsequent studies have corroborated this study. 
One particularly large study of nearly 50,000 respondents in 
67 countries found those who identifi ed with their national 
community observed COVID restrictions to a greater extent.55 
What is more, there is some experimental evidence that 
framing messages in terms of collective as opposed to 
personal interest increases intentions to adhere56,57 and 
leaders who succeed in building public adherence do so by 
means of constructing a strong sense of shared identity.58,59
All this work points to the prescience (and the science) 
of Cuomo’s words. An understanding of the reasons for 
adherence does indeed depend upon getting our head 
around the ‘we concept’ (or, to be more technical, around 
the nature of social identity processes).60 Conversely, an 
understanding of human behaviour which acknowledges the 
power of communal processes is essential to developing an 
effective response to this crisis.
Rethinking the psychology of crisis: short- 
and long-term implications
This brief overview of behavioural responses to the pandemic 
shows that, for COVID as for other crises, resilience more 
than frailty seems the order of the day. This is most 
obvious at a descriptive level. For all the ongoing fears 
about people lacking the psychological ability to cope with 
COVID restrictions and the concern that the public would be 
the weak link in the pandemic response, the opposite has 
proved to be the case. The real story of this crisis in the UK 
and probably elsewhere has been the mundane heroism of 
many millions of people who have stayed quietly at home, 
avoiding the social contacts with friends and family that 
they crave – even if this makes far less of a headline than 
the tens or occasionally hundreds of people at a rave or 
house party.
But the contrast between resilience and frailty approaches 
is equally stark at an explanatory level. Even when people 
failed to adhere, weak or ill-will had little to do with it and 
when people did adhere it was rooted in a sense of ‘we-
ness’. It was facilitated by the emergence of community 
support structures throughout the country which helped 
people through the crisis in multiple ways: from checking in 
to see if they were OK, to delivering food, to assisting with 
caring responsibilities (for instance, by developing online 
activities for children).61 Indeed, such mutual community 
level activity was critical in supporting people where 
traditional national and local government services were 
unable to cope.62
Of course, it is a stretch to assert that community formation 
and community engagement play a central part in combatting 
contagion.63,64 However, a psychology of collective resilience 
complements and consolidates these public health insights by 
explaining how communities can be formed (but also, how they 
can be undermined) and by explicating the processes through 
which community impacts behaviour.
There is a further important point. The problem with a fragility 
perspective lies not just with its inability to account for how 
people respond in a crisis (and more widely). It lies equally 
(if not more) in the ways that it underpins responses that 
can have profound and troubling impacts on the response. 
We have already pointed to the way in which the notion of 
‘behavioural fatigue’ may have delayed action in March 2020 
(on 11 March, Deputy Chief Medical Offi cer for England, Dr 
Jenny Harries told NBC News: ‘Timing of an intervention is 
absolutely critical. Put it in too early, you have a time period 
[where] people actually get non-compliant – they won’t want 
to keep it going for a long time’).65 The impact of such ideas 
does not stop there.
To start with, the continuous concern with people breaking 
the rules, along with messaging that warns against such 
behaviour, arguably runs the danger of promoting the very 
behaviours that it warns against. By telling people that others 
do not adhere, one can create a norm of non-adherence, 
which then makes such behaviour seem more acceptable.66 
Moreover, if everybody else is at the party, what is the point 
of missing out at home?
Equally, there is a risk that a narrative of blame may encourage 
people to perceive their neighbours as a problem, to suspect 
them of acting selfi shly if they see them going out or else 
others coming into their house rather than asking whether 
they need help in order to be able to cope with restrictions. 
It may go some way to explain why so many of us think that 
others are violating the rules. It certainly does nothing to 
sustain that sense of community which is at the core of a 
successful COVID response.67
But the blame narratives do not just disrupt the sense of 
shared identity amongst members of the public. As we have 
already suggested, they can also set the government in 
opposition to the public by making laws, rules and regulations 
seem like an alien imposition rather than an expression of 
shared values. They thereby undermine adherence.68,69 And 
it is not just about blame. It is all the more general forms 
of paternalism which fl ow from the notion that the public 
psychology is inherently fl awed and not up to the rigours of 
dealing with a crisis: the lack of transparency and fear of 
giving a full and frank assessment of mistakes, the refusal 
to acknowledge mistakes, the lack of respect and trust 
rooted in the notion that the public are not a partner but a 
ward of government. There is a strong conceptual basis for 
considering that all of these split government from society 
and an urgent need for research to address these issues in 
the context of COVID.
Finally, were all this not serious enough alone, the reluctance 
to be open about risks and a tendency to excessive optimism 
in order to preserve ‘morale’ and prevent ‘panic’ misses the 
fact that far from deaths in disasters stemming from the 
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provision of too much information, it is far more common 
that people die because they are given too little information, 
too late and hence fail to protect themselves from danger.70
In practical terms, what all these arguments point to is 
the need to pivot away from the sense that the public 
are part of the problem during this pandemic to a clear 
articulation that they are part of the solution. Instead of 
blaming people for non-adherence we need to praise them 
for their remarkable adherence. Instead of publicising 
stories of occasional gross violations we need to tell 
stories of mundane observances.71 And, most importantly, 
instead of concentrating on what can be done to stop non-
adherence, the focus of authorities should be on how to 
support people so that they can adhere. Not only will such 
support overcome the practical barriers to adherence and 
hence deal with the major reasons why people are breaking 
the COVID rules, it will also demonstrate that governments 
are indeed on the side of the people and hence enhance 
the motivation to adhere. 
For the longer term, one of the few positive things to come 
out of this grim pandemic in the UK and elsewhere is that 
it has shown us the remarkable and inspirational resilience 
of individuals when brought together as a community. Going 
forward, this is a lesson we must not forget. In terms of public 
health, it underpins the importance both of acting in ways that 
enhance rather than weaken the fragile sense of social identity 
that emerges in a crisis and also of engaging community 
groups as a central element in crisis response plans. 
More widely, it encourages us to rethink the relationship 
between the state and society. On the one hand, government 
should acknowledge the power of community members to 
self-organise and to play a role in providing services to each 
other. On the other hand, it is equally important not to use 
this as an excuse to withdraw public funding and expect 
communal self-organisation to take up the slack. As has been 
made clear during the pandemic, self-organisation is not easy 
and it becomes ever harder to maintain over time (especially 
in more deprived communities) without help, training and 
resources from central or local authorities.72,73 
The model, then, is of a state that scaffolds self-organisation. 
It is not necessarily a cheap option. However, it is an effective 
option in terms of creating and sustaining the resilience 
which we have seen over the last year and which will be so 
important in facing up to the shocks that are to come. 
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